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Review Essay
Confronting terrorism : 
British Experiences past and present
David Brown, The European Union, counter terrorism and police co-operation, 
1992-2007, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010, 204 pp., ISBN 9 
780719 07464. 
David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency 1945-1967, Oxford, OUP, 
2011, 283 pp., ISBN 9 780199 587964. 
Robert Lambert, Countering Al-Qaeda in London : Police and Muslims in 
Partnership, London, Hurst & co., 2011, 402 pp., ISBN 9 7818 4904. 
confronting terrorism has been a principal objective of the united States and 
other Western governments since the mid-1990s. the watershed of the 9/11 attacks 
in 2001 harnessed calls for more  comprehensive and sophisticated counter-terrorism 
strategies to be instigated on a global basis. By extension the united Kingdom has 
a history of  confronting terrorist challenges both domestically and overseas, within 
a colonial and post-colonial  context and later in collaboration with its european 
and uS partners. this general theme underpins each of these three excellent books 
which in turn detail a range of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist policies 
and practices developed from 1945 to the present day. together and from differing 
perspectives, the three address issues of  contemporary history and link these closely 
to  contemporary state practice.
in The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, the historian david french presents a 
revisionist analysis of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism  conducted through 
the military, policing and administrative lens of ten colonial campaigns from 1945 
through to the withdrawal from Aden in 1967. using an impressive array of primary 
and secondary sources, french explores the “brutality of empire”, the  state’s use 
of coercive mechanisms as integral to the successful implementation of British 
policy. here french aims to redirect our understanding of the management of this 
era of decolonisation – and particularly the traditional view of coiN that remains 
entrenched within policy-makers and the military – so that present day  conflict 
and hostile environment situations might be approached with greater insight. 
considering counter-terrorism in the  contemporary period, david  Brown’s European 
Union, counter terrorism and police co-operation scrutinises the difficulties states 
have faced with the integration of counter-terrorist policies into european union 
government structures. As such this book delivers a substantive analysis of pre – and 
post-9/11 europe in relation to unfolding counter-terrorism strategies and the building 
of european-wide police co-operation,  considering the “true impact of this event”. 
 europe’s approach to counter-terrorism as Brown notes has had wider ramifications 
following the bombings in madrid in 2004 and in London 7/7 2005 – as well as a 
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host of other incidents. this has led to further changes within the legislation and 
attempts at police-building across all member states with significant implications for 
the citizen. the difficulties faced by police officers in delivering effective counter-
terrorism at grass roots level are exposed in Robert  Lambert’s Countering Al-Qaeda 
in London. Lambert is a former metropolitan police Special Branch officer who has 
detailed the journey taken between 2002 and 2007 to pioneer “ controversial counter-
terrorism partnership projects” with muslim  communities in London. Lambert has 
used this memoir to “challenge” British counter-terrorist policy and strategy which 
he argues has “undermined” the international reputation of British policing. the 
policing that earned this reputation, he feels, is needed to encourage the government 
to work with radical but non-violent muslim organisations.
in essence each of these three books chart the  state’s – and most specifically the 
united  Kingdom’s – changing (and often hidden) approaches to counter-terrorism 
from a post-colonial cold War world to the so-called ‘War on terror’ today. they 
provide an opportunity to  consider whether a ‘British’ way has had impact not only 
domestically but within a wider european and international  context. they  contribute 
to the newer writings of British counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism which 
expose the darker sides to that ‘British’ way. As Lambert notes : one of the “many 
negative unintended  consequences of the War on terror has been the juxtaposition of 
international policing methods in which the Peelian notion of ‘policing by  consent’ 
has often been overshadowed and eclipsed by the practice of state terror, torture 
and coercion”. indeed each of these books serves as a reminder of the uneasy line 
drawn between the state and the citizen in maintaining a democratic status quo when 
 confronted by acts of terrorism or serious public unrest. 
A widely held view is that terrorism is essentially a pre-meditated political act 
which is not simply aimed at specific victims but typically impacts upon a far wider 
audience. the tactics used by the different agencies – government departments, the 
military, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency services and 
any other groups situated within society are essentially in response to a need to 
impose order and regain sovereignty. in the Western world the range of counter-
terrorist measures have been embedded within a wider criminal justice framework. 
however, the post-1945 era saw the uK, europe and the wider world increasingly 
challenged by insurgency and terrorist activities which necessitated a  common 
approach. twenty-first-century counter-terrorist strategies adopted by the uK have 
become subsumed within a uS global War on terror. in essence the uK has had to 
learn how to operate within a multi-agency and multinational environment and to 
build the necessary relationships. As Al-Qaeda has become identified as the ‘new’ 
terrorist threat there has been a move away from the historic ‘old’ terrorism in the 
uK which came principally from Northern-ireland-related organisations.
the earlier counter-terrorist strategies that emerged in Northern ireland stemmed 
from a colonial root and the earlier British experiences of its small colonial wars. 
As french points out in The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, a golden age of 
British counter-insurgency experiences occurred post-1945 including malaya 
(1948-1960) ; Kenya (1952-1956) ; cyprus (1955-1960) and oman (1965-1975). 
each has been held to be a ‘classical’ counter-insurgency campaign  contributing 
to the management of the Northern ireland  conflict. in particular, as french argues, 
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the malayan ‘doctrine’ as pioneered by Sir henry Gurney, Sir harold Briggs, 
General Sir Gerald templer and Sir Robert thompson became a British showcase 
for classical counter-insurgency warfare that the military in other countries could 
emulate. As  french’s thesis progresses, he demolishes the traditional ‘hearts and 
minds’ myth that lay at the core of the British way. his analysis of the ‘British’ 
approach to counter-insurgency as practiced by soldiers, colonial police, security 
services, administrators and Whitehall politicians demonstrates that many were not 
“always  committed to fighting with kid gloves” when it came to managing the end 
of empire. this remains an important issue, argues french, and not simply in relation 
to historical enquiry but in relation to the misunderstandings that have surrounded 
British counter-insurgency which has  continued to inform British military doctrine 
and practice even to this day. Nonetheless, the British solution to colonial  conflict 
and profound social unrest rested upon the practice of the ‘malayan model’ through 
the  concept of the ‘three-legged stool’ : the co-ordination of efforts by the military, 
colonial police and administration. Whether it could be judged successful, as far 
as the British were  concerned, hinged upon the extent to which this  concept was 
replicated in other parts of the empire and beyond. on the ground, the practical 
failures that ensued (for example a paucity in intelligence gathering and analysis) 
necessitated a ‘sledge hammer’ approach towards the local population which 
included mass-arrests, detentions, cordons and searches and collective punishments. 
Part of this British way lay in the perception of who  constituted an enemy of the 
state – the ‘malayan model’ of counter-insurgency laid emphasis on defeating the 
military opponents as well as political subversives. in doing so this British way may 
have failed to fully balance the needs of different  communities alongside the ability 
to detect exactly who was that enemy of the state. in Palestine, for example, french 
notes how the British faced difficulties in addressing the very different needs of 
the jewish and Arab  communities. this was also true of cyprus where 80% of the 
 island’s ethnic Greek population (who sought union with Greece) were opposed by 
the remaining 20% of the ethnic turkish population. in both cases the British were 
hard put to balance the political and military aspirations of the individual parties 
and often misdirected reappraisals, clamping down on the local population. So “far 
from accepting their enemies had genuine grievances” the British had a tendency 
to resort to marginalisation and criminalisation. the paradox to all of this was a 
genuine belief upheld that the British way was not only the ‘right approach’ but 
grounded in paternalism.
using coercive approaches, however veiled, was also important, notes french, 
to maintaining discipline amongst those soldiers and police officers who were often 
called to make a judgement that their actions were aligned with the rule of law. 
here the British approach was to maintain the outward appearance of legality : the 
1939 emergency Powers order in council informed both the military and police 
operationally, allowed for the suspension of ordinary law and initially became 
the legal basis of emergency situations in Kenya, cyprus and Nyasaland. these 
emergency powers were then  combined with local legislation to frame emergency 
regulations within a specific colonial environment. in essence emergency regulations 
were about British forces ‘taking the war to the enemy’, ‘harassing insurgents’ and, if 
necessary, intimidating the local population. this could include the use of collective 
punishment (fines, curfews and so on), mass-arrests, and detention without trial, 
deportation and resettlement. in effect these became ‘ control regulations’ which 
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allowed the colonial state to widen the definition of criminalisation and punishment 
(including the death penalty). this, french notes, may have been legal but was 
certainly not legitimate and coercive approaches – which amounted effectively to 
‘police state  controls’ – paved the way for  Britain’s ‘dirty wars’ which included 
unofficial reprisals against the population, the use of ‘death squads’, interrogation 
and torture and detention without trial. however, the problem with the use of an 
excessively coercive approach is that ‘hearts and minds’ will not be won. coercion, 
therefore, was not the only ‘weapon in the British counter-insurgents armoury’ ; both 
the insurgents and the civil population were courted through political, economic, 
social and  cultural development. this too, argues french, had a flip side. the use 
of psychological warfare (or Psychops) to help ‘turn’ insurgents was undertaken 
through intimidation as well as offering financial incentives. colonial development 
programmes underpinned by the colonial development and Welfare Acts, were 
largely funded by the colonies : between 1946 and 1957 approximately £1,000 
million was spent on projects intended to develop colonial economies, improve 
health and education and so on of which 60% emanated from their own tax revenues 
and a further 18.7% from international loans which became a burden on individual 
colonies. it was only in the case of far smaller civic action ‘grass roots’ programmes 
that real aid was provided to local populations but once again at a price. in the wake 
of the Radfan campaign, for example in 1964, British troops distributed supplies of 
flour, oil, grain and tea to the local tribes once peace had been agreed. Promoting 
patronage at a local level was by then perceived as a necessary approach in the 
developing world to prevent the Soviets from developing relationships with the 
 europe’s former colonies. the winding down of  Britain’s empire coincided with 
more serious cold War threats and the need for effective ‘western’ approaches to 
both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism to have global outreach.
As Brown clearly outlines in European Union, counter terrorism and police co-
operation counter-terrorism involves a range of ‘actions’ which rest upon a changing 
legal basis as during the earlier colonial period. informal police co-operation stemmed 
from the 1970s with the trevi Group established to tackle international terrorism 
and then to address other areas of transnational crime within europe. following 
a series of legislative changes, it was not until 1998 that the europol convention 
provided the legal basis for europol. it has never been a traditional eu agency but 
described as an ‘international organisation’ with its own legal framework funded by 
member states. the convention has been amended three times and this has gradually 
extended  europol’s mandate to dealing with issues of  common interest including 
counter-terrorism, asylum, immigration, external border co-operation,  combating 
drug addiction and fraud. As Brown has demonstrated, the path to european police 
co-operation has been all but smooth and europol has often been held ‘at  arm’s 
length’ in terms of the operational side to policing with a primarily ‘operative’ role. 
even with gradual amendments to  europol’s legal framework and the easing of 
police co-operation, it was not until a second protocol was signed in 2002 that the 
basis for joint investigation teams was established, and then only in 2008 that most 
association agreements had been  concluded.  Brown’s fine analysis demonstrates that 
despite a widely held view that police must cooperate beyond national boundaries 
to manage rising transnational crime and terrorism,  europe’s progress in this sphere 
has been painfully slow
this raises the question as to the relevance of the ‘British Way’ within wider 
european (and international) counter-terrorism  contexts. When  considering the 
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development of a legislative framework for police co-operation and counter-
terrorism, Brown notes that following 11 September 2001 the uK had the “most 
extensive array of counter-terrorist legislation” in all of the (then) fifteen eu member 
states. the Northern ireland  conflict which had spread to the uK mainland led to 
the Prevention of terrorism Act provisions becoming statutory in 2000. in terms of 
counter-terrorism strategies it should be noted that the  military’s institutional memory 
had been built on earlier colonial coiN and then carried forward to create a Northern 
irish legacy. Where it is not entirely clear is the extent to which the european union 
‘added value’ or eroded these principles when rising to challenge of european-wide 
counter-terrorist policies. it would appear that ‘slippage’ has occurred between 
eu-state-led proposals and the empirical realities – or the difference between what 
the decision-makers had argued for and their actual implementation. clearly the 
widening and deepening of the european union has the ability to weaken rather 
than strengthen multi-agency partnerships whether in counter-terrorism or aspects of 
transnational crime. this can be demonstrated by  europol’s fragmented approaches 
to the management of both european and international policing missions including 
those to the Balkans and further afield in Georgia and Afghanistan. Within this 
 context any attempt at bringing Britishness (not only through europol but also the 
Serious organized crime Agency) is swallowed up by the wider european rhetoric. 
the “overall ongoing  confusion over the purpose of a greater eu level of police 
activity” has led to difficulties in reaching agreements in relation to both human 
and drugs trafficking and terrorism, which may suggest that really effective counter-
terrorist strategies are better when home grown.
here we turn to  Lambert’s Countering Al-Qaeda in London with a structure that 
uses four London underground stations ( King’s cross, finsbury Park, Brixton and 
Victoria) to  consider “the geography and chronology of counter-terrorism police 
work”.  Lambert’s charting of his counter-terrorism policing between 2002 and 2007 
is the most  controversial of the three books and came under extensive criticism 
from “some of the most influential voices in the British media and their transatlantic 
allies”. essentially this criticism reposed upon whether Lambert – and the work of 
his metropolitan Police Special Branch (mPSB) colleagues in the muslim contact 
unit (mcu) – was legitimate as well as effective in  combating extremism within 
muslim  communities in London. this emanated, as Lambert noted, from the view 
that “a tension was perceived to exist between ‘hard’ investigative counter-terrorism 
and ‘soft’  community policing in support of counter-terrorism”. initially  Lambert’s 
approach was simply to encourage dialogue in relation to potential al-Qaeda threats 
to Britain with muslim organisations and the representatives of mosques in London. 
this developed further with mcu engaging with the muslim Association of Britain 
and the muslim Welfare house to challenge al-Qaeda influences within Brixton 
which included the mosque. At no time, however, as Lambert makes clear, was there 
an intention to recruit muslim  community leaders as “covert human intelligence 
sources” (informants) aligning with ‘harder’ counter-terrorist policing, but to work 
with these ‘London partnerships’ to create a form of ‘soft’  community engagement. 
certainly within the post-7/7 counter-terrorism policing  context in england and 
Wales, there have been links forged between  community-based and intelligence-
centred policing models : more recent neighbourhood policing schemes are reliant in 
part on intelligence gathering. in these  contexts it has been argued that police officers 
can persuade members of the  community of the benefits in working closely with 
the police in relation to anti-social behaviour and crime, though the evidence that 
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this works in relation to counter-terrorism is more limited and remains problematic. 
despite the evidence to the  contrary, Lambert reflects that “this case study approach 
provides  compelling evidence that endorses legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
mcu partnership initiatives in finsbury Park and Brixton” ; the evidence  coming, 
for example, from the removal of the extremist Abu hamza and his supporters from 
finsbury mosque.
this issue here is that the mcu began their London partnerships’ programme 
before the uK  government’s ‘Preventing Violent extremism’ had been fully 
implemented. this counter-terrorism strategy was developed following 7/7 and 
for example made financial  contributions to almost 100 local authorities to help 
 combat terrorism in their local areas whilst being specifically targeted to the al-
Qaeda threat. moreover, mPSB had been absorbed into a great counter-terrorism 
branch of mPS which was by then  confronted by the home office and Security 
Services’ “greater  control of intelligence gathering and strategy”. the backbone to 
this was the 2006 counter-terrorism strategy coNteSt : “to reduce the risk to the 
uK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives 
freely and with  confidence”. coNteSt has four strands : PRotect (the defence 
of important buildings and the  uK’s infrastructure) ; PReVeNt (preparation for the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack) ; PeRSue (arrest the perpetrators) and PRePARe 
(stop people from becoming or supporting terrorists). it is the latter – PReVeNt – 
that has formed the basis of a ‘new’ form of counter-terrorism to enable the police 
to prevent an act of terrorism before it has been  committed and has been described 
as an ‘anti-extremism’ programme which requires police to work in partnership with 
other agencies and stakeholders within local society. it was within the PReVeNt 
strand that the mcu London partnerships were  considered to be working “to a 
discarded mPSB model that was out of kilter with the Association of chief Police 
officers thinking and the wider War on terror” and raising questions in relation 
to the legitimacy of working with potential extremists. Lambert had advocated a 
‘softer’  community and indeed truly ‘hearts and minds’ approach within his London 
experiment. he  concludes that just prior to the submission of his research project, the 
united States General david Petraeus, in a lecture on military strategy in Afghanistan 
and the importance of tackling the terrorist threat in London, made reference to a 
decline in need for a ‘hearts and minds’ policing approach in favour of hard edge 
counter-insurgency and counter-subversive strategies. this, argued Lambert, paved 
the way for future counter-terrorism policing that would mirror the earlier Royal 
ulster constabulary and colonial Special Branch policing models and paradoxically 
endorse an older ‘British way’.
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